Rapid digitisation of rail systems and infrastructure has exacerbated risks posed by malicious threat actors to value and supply chains, including state-sponsored actors, cybercriminal groups, hacktivists and insiders who seek to exploit vulnerabilities in response to the adoption of new technologies.
Rail management systems today often rely on a combination of legacy and modernised systems to deliver and manage services. This is further complicated by the long technology replacement lifecycles for OT systems, which are typically up to 15-20 years, resulting in the operation and maintenance of unsupported legacy infrastructure that has reached end-of-life. Rail transport operators and infrastructure maintainers are reliant on these legacy and modernised systems to ensure the performance and reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS) of rail services, in accordance with service level agreements.
Rail entities and their operations are also commonly siloed into separate organisational departments, namely design and engineering, operations and maintenance, which can cause issues in organisational communication and blur accountabilities as there is no dedicated function accountable for cybersecurity.
The use of digital technology to control, monitor and communicate train movements and network conditions, including for real-time passenger information, has also led to significant advances in IT and OT system convergence and integration.
All these factors contribute to the expansion of cyber threat scenarios and potential risks by increasing the complexity of managing cybersecurity effectively. Put simply, these causal factors are prevalent and make rail an easy and attractive target for malicious threat actors.
In 2015, European security experts created “Project Honey Train” as a simulated subway control system to identify and analyse how cybercriminals would gain access to a railway created wholly online. In short, a model was developed of a fictitious, virtual rail transport control and operating system acting as a ‘honeypot’ to hackers, in order to evaluate the risk of cyberattack. Over a six-week period, there were 2.7 million unauthorised access attempts against the firewalls, CCTV and media servers. In several instances, hackers were successfully able to access the train control systems.
Whilst Project Honey Train is nearly a decade old, cyberattacks and incidents on rail networks continue to occur, proving threat actors possess the necessary knowledge to effectively target and comprise critical infrastructure.