Building cyber resilience into the operational technology that powers Australian ports

For port authorities, terminal operators, shipping lines, logistics providers and delivery partners, OT cybersecurity can no longer be left until the end of a project. When cyber risks are not considered early, projects can face assurance gaps, commissioning delays and costly rework. Critical systems may also be exposed to avoidable disruption across vessel movements, cargo handling, gate operations and landside freight flows.

For port leaders, the issue is not just whether systems are technically secure. It is whether cybersecurity has been considered early enough to support safe operations, commissioning, assurance, regulatory obligations and continuity of port services.

Bringing OT cybersecurity into the project from the start supports safety, engineering and operational requirements. It also helps build a stronger assurance case and supports regulatory obligations.

Cybersecurity often surfaces late in delivery, when the asset is nearing commissioning, the safety case is being finalised, and independent reviewers want evidence that the asset is ready for service. Too often, project teams find they cannot clearly demonstrate how cyber risks were identified, managed, and controlled, making remediation costly, disruptive and a threat to the delivery timeline.

The same discipline applied to asset safety should also apply to cybersecurity. A loss of cybersecurity can contribute to safety incidents in OT systems. It can also reduce asset availability, disrupt operations and affect the wider port ecosystem. If a project must demonstrate how safety risks have been managed before an asset enters service, the same expectations should apply to OT cybersecurity.

Port projects are typically shaped in the first years by significant investment in earthworks, wharf and berth infrastructure, civil construction, structures, and mechanical and electrical fit-out. As a result, cybersecurity can receive less attention during early project phases.

This is where risk can emerge. A system may appear secure on its own, but vulnerabilities often sit between systems, vendors, communications networks and external parties. In a port environment, these connections can include terminal operating systems, berth and vessel scheduling systems, cargo handling equipment, cranes, automated handling systems, access control and gate systems, utilities, environmental monitoring, and navigational support systems.

Communications networks should therefore not be viewed as background data networks. They are critical to the connection of the systems that enable safe and efficient port operations and should be conceived as systems in their own right.

The risk is also shaped by the number of organisations that connect into port operations, including port authorities, terminal operators, shipping lines, rail and road freight providers, customs, biosecurity, sustainable energy providers, contractors and technology vendors.

Where these connections involve OT, they should be managed as part of the engineered system because they turn digital instructions into physical actions. This helps to creates safety, availability and operational consequences that require an OT cybersecurity approach distinct from enterprise IT cybersecurity.

If that OT is not secured, the impact can go beyond data loss to delayed vessel movements, interrupted cargo handling, gate congestion, loss of service and impact on site safety.

When cybersecurity issues arise, teams may point to previous projects or similar designs that were accepted elsewhere. That experience can be useful, but it is not enough.

Each project needs to be assessed against current threats, asset-specific risks and the consequences of disruption. Reviewers need to see how risks have been managed for the asset in front of them. Previous designs may also need to be changed to accommodate shifts in the port operating environment, as arrangements that were sound at one point can be overtaken by new threats, new interfaces or new operational demands.

This is particularly important for communications networks, which connect many of the safety and control systems that enable a connected port, delivering the visibility, performance and operational coordination that modern operations depend on.

For example, an approach that has worked in one terminal may not be suitable for another port environment if it has different third-party access arrangements, automation requirements, legacy systems, operational zones or interfaces with landside freight networks. Without early assessment, these differences can create gaps in segmentation, monitoring, access control and assurance.

Designing OT cybersecurity well means coordinating it across the port’s operational technology, rather than adding it separately through each package or vendor.

The port-wide OT environment should be grounded in two design principles. Defence-in-depth provides multiple layers of protection, to reduce the likelihood that a single security failure will compromise the wider environment. Secure-by-design helps make sure each device, system, and interface is configured securely from the start. In practical terms, this means controls such as network segmentation, access control and monitoring, are planned, integrated and tested as part of the overall OT system design.

For ports, this means identifying dependencies across marine, terminal, landside, utility, enterprise and third-party environments, while maintaining clear security boundaries, ownership and accountability for each domain. These represent distinct security domains, each with its own risks, owners, and controls. Enterprise port IT systems are no less critical simply because they sit outside the traditional OT boundary.

The aim is not to combine IT and OT cybersecurity, but to coordinate the dependencies and interfaces between them. This allows each domain to manage its own risks and controls while helping prevent gaps where systems connect.

Establishing this coordination early makes it easier to demonstrate how cybersecurity protects operational technology assets and supports safe and reliable port operations.

Cybersecurity should follow the same structured delivery approach as safety and engineering. It needs to be built into project gates, not checked only at the end.
This means identifying cyber risks early, setting clear requirements and allocating responsibility across engineering, operations and delivery teams. It also means maintaining a clear link between threats, controls and risk treatment decisions.

Recognised standards, such as AS IEC 62443 in Australia, can guide governance, risk assessment, system design and assurance. For operators subject to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act, this approach can also support Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program obligations.

• Design OT cybersecurity into port projects from the start so it supports safe operations, commissioning, assurance and continuity of port services.
• Build assurance evidence throughout project delivery.
• Treat communications networks as critical assets.
• Assess risk against current threats and asset-specific impacts.
• Maintain distinct security domains, with clear ownership and coordinated controls at their interfaces.
• Evaluate risk within each domain and across the interfaces and dependencies that connect them.
• Plan for the operational impacts of cyber disruption, including vessel delays, interrupted cargo handling and congestion across landside freight flows.
• Apply recognised standards to support governance, assurance and monitoring.